Transnational tobacco manufacturing and tobacco leaf companies engage in numerous efforts to oppose global tobacco control. One of their strategies is to stress the economic importance of tobacco to the developing countries that grow it.
We analyze tobacco industry documents and ethnographic data to show how tobacco companies used this argument in the case of Malawi, producing and disseminating reports promoting claims of losses of jobs and foreign earnings that would result from the impending passage of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). In addition, they influenced the government of Malawi to introduce resolutions or make amendments to tobacco-related resolutions in meetings of United Nations organizations, succeeding in temporarily displacing health as the focus in tobacco control policymaking. However, these efforts did not substantially weaken the FCTC. (Am J Public Health. 2 0 0 9 ; 9 9 : 1 7 5 9 -1771. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2008.
146217)
MALAWI BEGAN EXPORTING tobacco in 1893, 1 and today it is the world's most tobacco-dependent economy. Tobacco accounts for 70% of Malawi's foreign earnings, 2, 3 and 600000 to 2 million members of the country's total workforce of 5 million people are directly employed in the tobacco sector, which consists primarily of tobacco farming and factory processing jobs. 4 US-based tobacco leaf-buying companies Universal Corporation and Alliance One International control tobacco prices and influence trade policies in Malawi, restricting competition, depressing tobacco prices for Malawi's farmers, and contributing to the country's poverty. 5 Cigarette manufacturers and global leaf companies (merchant companies that buy tobacco leaf through prearranged contracts with manufacturers) fund child labor ''corporate social responsibility'' projects in Malawi to distract public attention from how they profit from low wages and cheap tobacco. 6 In addition, British American Tobacco (BAT), other cigarette manufacturers, and the International Tobacco Growers' Association (ITGA), an organization created by tobacco companies in 1984 to weaken global tobacco control activities, [7] [8] [9] have used the governments of Malawi and other developing countries to lobby against global tobacco control efforts, 7, 10 particularly the World Health Organization (WHO)
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC; Table 1 ).
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The FCTC is an international treaty designed to reduce the health damage of tobacco by committing signatories to enact laws that control the tobacco industry's production and promotion of tobacco, increase taxes, and promote education about the dangers of tobacco use and secondhand smoke. The FCTC was passed in February 2005, and, as of April 2009, 164 countries (not including the United States) had ratified and were implementing the framework. Malawi is an extreme but not unique case of how transnational tobacco companies have used developing countries' economic reliance on tobacco to oppose global tobacco control. 11 As part of a broader strategy involving other tobacco-growing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, and Zimbabwe, BAT and the ITGA sought the assistance of Malawi grower representatives and government officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to argue tobacco's economic contribution in Malawi and pressure United Nations (UN) organizations involved in tobacco control to stress this contribution, diluting the health focus of tobacco control and delaying passage of the FCTC.
The tobacco industry's influence on health policymaking in Malawi involves relationships between institutions and power and between the global and local levels 12 : ''the constellation of actors, activities, and influences that shape policy decisions and their implementation, effects, and how they play out.'' 13(p30) Researchers and social scientists have applied an anthropology of policy approach to the study of the influence of industrialized farming on communities, 14 to discussions of language and power in written policy documents on economic development, 15 and to the effects of contrasting meaning structures on environmental conflicts. 16 Despite transnational tobacco manufacturing and leaf companies' high level of influence on health policies and tobaccogrowing societies, anthropologists and health researchers have ignored the policy chain from tobacco farmers (policy recipients) to tobacco companies (policy influencers) and government officials (policymakers) that shapes policy directions and relationships ( Figure 1 ). We analyzed tobacco companies' use of economic arguments regarding the benefits of tobacco in Malawi to obstruct the FCTC between 1992, when the idea of the framework first took Using the snowball method, we identified key themes and terms (e.g., ''health policy,'' ''policymaking,'' ''economic benefits,'' and ''tobacco growing'') in the initial industry documents we found that were consistent with the research on tobacco industry influence in Malawi. We conducted follow-up searches with these terms (as well as searches with the names of key individuals and organizations and adjacent page [Bates] numbers). Lexus Nexus, World Cat, the University of California's Melvyl library catalog, and Internet search engines-Google (http://www. google.com), Yahoo (http://www. yahoo.com), and Clusty (http:// clusty.com) were used to obtain information that would corroborate findings from industry documents. We screened 1890 documents and used 35 in detailing the results of this study.
M. Otañ ez conducted semistructured interviews with 124 tobacco workers, farm authority representatives, trade unionists, government officials, and corporate executives from transnational tobacco leaf companies during 6 visits to Malawi between 1998 and 2006. These individuals were selected on the basis of their willingness to take part in the study, their knowledge of health policymaking in Malawi, and their experiences with influential organizations relevant to tobacco control and the tobacco industry in Malawi.
The question guide for interviews was developed in consultation with key informants (e.g., health policymakers and trade union leaders) and the experience gained from repeated visits to Malawi. As our knowledge of Malawi's tobacco sector deepened, we modified our questions to elicit a deeper understanding of the research themes and added new questions based on conversations with experts and in consultation with colleagues at the University of California. We cross-checked ethnographic information gathered from our primary interviews with observations and interviews with industry officials, tobacco workers, and government representatives over time as well as with tobacco-related newspaper stories, published and unpublished reports, archival material, scholarly literature, and corporate literature (e.g., tobacco industry documents).
M. G. Otañ ez used the standard anthropological method of participant observation, wherein researchers immerse themselves in a particular social environment over a long period of time in an attempt to gain an understanding of the behaviors and perspectives of the people residing in that environment. 20 Participant observations were conducted in union meetings on tobacco farms, foreign-donorfunded union workshops and training sessions held in urban hotels, the headquarters of the tobacco workers' union, the Malawi Congress of Trade Unions (Limbe and Lilongwe), the Tobacco Association of Malawi, the Tobacco Export Association of Malawi, the Tobacco Control Commission, and auction floors in Lilongwe and Blantyre.
RESULTS
In 2005, Malawi was the 7th largest global exporter of tobacco leaves and the 12th largest producer of tobacco leaves. 21 The growing, marketing, and selling of tobacco accounts for 23% of Malawi's total tax base 22 and 61% of the country's exports, with tea, sugar, textiles, and cotton representing its other major exports ( Table 2 ) . 23 Malawi is the 14th poorest country in the world and has some of the world's lowest human development indicators: 65% of the population is below the national poverty line, the adult illiteracy rate is 36%, 27% of the country's residents do not have access to clean water, and 44% will not survive to the age of 40 years. 24 The smoking rate among adults older than 18 years is 12.7%.
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Since the initiation of tobacco growing in Malawi in 1893, representatives of transnational tobacco manufacturing (and, later, leaf) companies and Malawi's government have exhibited a shared interest in sustaining a profitable and expanding tobacco sector in the country, despite labor, economic, and environmental practices that harm many of the country's citizens. 1, 26, 27 At the same time, however, tension has existed between the tobacco industry and the government over tobacco pricing and quality, as well as industry control over processing and distribution. 5, 28, 29 Transnational tobacco manufacturing and leaf companies developed an interest in the government of Malawi as an ally against tobacco control in the 1970s, when Malawi emerged as a major tobacco-producing country 30 and was the focus of 1978 British media accounts reporting that BAT profited from the country's poverty and government corruption. 31, 32 According to a BAT report, the negative media attention of 1978 raised ''doubts in the minds of the uninformed by the antismoking lobby about the ethical stance'' of BAT, forcing the company to rethink ''the fairly low profile which [BAT] has until now adopted.'' 33 From that point on,
BAT would play a prominent role in the industry's efforts to lobby government and tobacco farming officials in Malawi, arguing that tobacco control would cut jobs, increase dependence on foreign aid, and worsen the poverty experienced by the country's citizens. In 1983 BAT, which dominates the cigarette market in Malawi and is the second largest buyer of Malawi tobacco from leaf processing companies, and Philip Morris, which has a small share of the cigarette market in Malawi but is the largest buyer of Malawi tobacco from leaf processing companies, 5 to oppose global tobacco control policies.
''Singing Off the Same Hymn Sheet''
As early as 1979, ITGA, BAT, other transnational manufacturing companies, and the Tobacco Institute, the US tobacco industry's lobbying arm, were publishing reports discrediting WHO and promoting the economic benefits of tobacco to counter global tobacco control. Tobacco companies and their surrogate groups generally produced these reports after public health researchers and organizations released reports on the economic harm of tobacco to developing countries. Martin Oldman, a BAT consultant and the head of ITGA activities (through his industry-funded United Kingdom consultancy group AgroTobacco Services), 39 wrote in November 1993 to ITGA's Henry Ntaba, the brother of Malawi Health Minister Hetherwick Ntaba, that the industry would ensure ITGA members were ''singing off the same hymn sheet'' to counter global tobacco control.
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At the first WHO All-Africa Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, in November 1993, the aim of which was to promote global tobacco control, ITGA organized a press conference to launch the ITGA publication Tobacco Trade or Aid?
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This document argued that tobacco control would threaten tobacco production and deepen developing countries' economic dependency on foreign aid. 42 The report concluded that, in the case of Malawi, the loss of ten percent of projected tobacco export earnings in 1995 would increase its deficit on the current account by more than 30 percent and would be equivalent to 6 percent of the aid received in 1991.
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In a joint 2000 study of Malawi's tobacco industry, the Tobacco Exporters' Association of Malawi, a group of tobacco leaf-buying companies that promote industry trade interests, and the Tobacco Control Commission of Malawi, the governmental regulatory body for the local tobacco sector, used the ITGA report to argue that ''WHO's global campaign would chop at least 10 percent off Malawi's tobacco earnings every year. '' 43 However, the FCTC's effects on global tobacco demand and on employment and farmers in Malawi will occur over several decades, 44, 45 ensuring that tobacco will remain central to Malawi's short-and medium-term economic growth. 4, 46 Graham (oral communication, August 2000) agreed with the notion that it was ''Malawi's intention is to be the country that produces the last leaf of tobacco.'' With the government of Malawi securely on board with tobacco industry activities designed to undermine the FCTC, BAT and ITGA used the government's stance to influence the first meeting of the INB. Given that some members of the Malawi INB1 delegation represented health interests and others represented industry interests, these individuals issued contradictory statements on the FCTC (J. Kapito, written communication, March 2007). During that meeting, Wesley Sangala, the Ministry of Health's chief technical advisor and an advisor to the INB1 Malawi delegation, noted that the Malawi delegation welcomed the FCTC and that the treaty would help local farmers find alternative crops to tobacco. 83 In fact, the governments of Malawi and Zimbabwe, as tobaccogrowing developing countries, were not always entirely supportive of the tobacco manufacturers. In April 2000, Eugene Philhower, an aide in the US trade mission in Geneva, Switzerland, reported to James Regan, a tobacco industry consultant, that the governments of Malawi and Zimbabwe were ''somewhat conflicted'':
While they sympathize with the developing countries on bashing the multinationals and criticizing the industrialized world, they also want to protect their own domestic industries. 61 Philhower added that ''there is a remote chance that Zimbabwe and Malawi will object or try to slow down'' the FCTC negotiations. 61 Other members of Malawi's delegation to INB1 argued that ''the treaty might not be in the best interest of Southern African tobacco growing countries. ' ] by the World Bank which has shown that in fact the demand is going to increase because the population overall will increase, [as will] the population of prospective tobacco smokers. Therefore, the demand for tobacco leaf is still going to be there. But at the beginning our view was that there would be a drastic reduction in the demand for the tobacco leaf and therefore our economies would suffer. We therefore put in the Convention programs that 
Steady Increases in Tobacco Leaf Global Demand
Transnational tobacco manufacturing and leaf companies and the government of Malawi are concerned with decreases in the global demand for tobacco after the implementation of tobacco control measures. Jacobs et al. noted that Malawi, relative to countries that are not major producers and net exporters of tobacco, ''would have higher transition costs if global demand falls.'' 98 A global decrease in demand for tobacco would create high transition costs and short-term job losses in Malawi, resulting in a need for financial assistance so that the country can pursue crop replacements and nontobacco jobs. 4, 99 FAO projected an annual growth in total tobacco leaf exports of 0.8% between 1991 and 2010. 68 Tobacco leaf production in Malawi and other developing countries increased from 76% in 1991 to 90% in 2006.
68, 100
As mentioned, the FCTC's effects on global tobacco demand will occur over several decades, not in the short term, and the impact on jobs and farmers will occur in future generations. 44, 45 Richard Tate, the ITGA president and the president of the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association, agreed with the belief of WHO representatives at a meeting in March 2000 that tobacco control measures would not create a significant drop in consumption of tobacco products in the short or medium term. 101 The FCTC in Malawi might reduce growth in the global demand for tobacco products rather than cause a sharp decline in tobacco use.
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To our knowledge, the potential short-and long-term effects of a global decline in tobacco consumption on Malawi's domestic economy have not been studied. In a draft study on tobacco control policies and employment, World Bank economist Ping Zhang suggested that threats to jobs from trade policies governing Malawi's export markets overshadow the threat to jobs in the country's tobacco sector from tobacco control policies. 
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DISCUSSION
Beginning in the 1980s, transnational tobacco manufacturing and leaf companies and surrogate groups used government and farming representatives in Malawi and other developing countries to weaken and delay global tobacco control efforts and influence the FCTC negotiations. 11 They used health policies as a vehicle to assert tobacco industry power and encourage the Malawi government to promote industry arguments about the economic benefits of tobacco to undermine the FCTC. In these efforts, the tobacco industry invoked a strategy similar to its 1980s argument that tobacco is not a Third World problem. However, the industry was unable to portray Malawi and other tobacco-growing developing countries as free from health and socioecological problems caused by tobacco use and tobacco farming. Transnational tobacco manufacturing and leaf companies used farmers and high-level officials at each end of the policy chain continuum to undermine measures designed to regulate tobacco production and consumption. BAT and other cigarette manufacturers, through ITGA, produced and disseminated reports on tobacco's contribution to Malawi's economy predicting that job losses would occur and foreign earnings would decrease with the passage of the FCTC.
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Industry representatives on Malawi's delegations to WHO meetings introduced resolutions or made amendments to tobaccorelated resolution in UN organizations focused on tobacco control to delay the policy process through research on the economic implications of tobacco control in tobaccogrowing countries. The FCTC negotiations primarily focused on health; however, the industry, through the Malawi government, lobbied to keep economic issues in the FCTC negotiations and argued for consideration of more research on tobacco economics. This focus on economics probably delayed the FCTC and contributed to weakening efforts to place public health considerations above trade. 105 As a result of Malawi's economic reliance on tobacco, the country is vulnerable to tobacco industry arguments that tobacco control contributes to job losses, foreign earnings reductions, and poverty. Although tobacco is cultivated in more than 130 countries, 106 In a June 2008 meeting of the ad hoc study group in Mexico City, Mexico, government leaders, policy experts, and civil society representatives agreed on a draft progress report on Article 17 of the FCTC, which focused on creating funding mechanisms to pay for crop substitution and alternative livelihood schemes in Malawi and other developing countries. The report was sent for comment to parties of the study group, revised, and presented at the Third Conference of the Parties in Durban, South Africa, in November 2008 (countries that are parties to the FCTC are members of the Conference of the Parties). Parties at that conference established a working group on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing to replace the study group and to draft guidelines for the implementation of Article 17.
The working group, made up of representatives from Brazil, Greece, India, and Mexico, was mandated to submit a progress report and, if possible, policy recommendations at the Fourth Conference of the Parties in Uruguay in 2010. Article 17 implementation guidelines as well as the guidelines adopted at the Third Conference of the Parties for FCTC Article 5.3, 111 which limits tobacco industry interference in tobacco control policymaking, will be used to promote nontobacco crops and limit tobacco companies' influence in crop replacement schemes. Through concerted efforts to reduce the lobbying power of tobacco companies and grower organizations in Malawi, health researchers and policy advocates could prevent the undermining of funding schemes and other efforts to diversify Malawi's economy that emerge from discussions on economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing.
In conclusion, BAT, Philip Morris, and ITGA attempted to weaken the FCTC through a proxy country, Malawi, and diverted the attention of tobacco control policymakers from health concerns to the framework's economic implications, particularly with respect to tobacco-growing countries. Transnational tobacco manufacturing and leaf companies and their surrogate groups (through TAMA) succeeded in influencing the government of Malawi to recommend that UN organizations involved in tobacco control conduct research on the economic contributions of tobacco to developing economies.
Despite evidence of the economic benefits of tobacco control, Malawi has been vulnerable to the economic arguments of the tobacco industry because of the country's extreme reliance on tobacco growing. As a result of the influence of BAT and Philip Morris, ITGA, and TAMA on health policymaking in Malawi and the country's dependence on tobacco growing without reliable substitutes or alternative livelihoods to tobacco in sight, Malawi represents a valuable case study through which tobacco control policymakers and educators can further their understanding of the obstacles involved in implementing effective tobacco control policies in developing economies.
Transnational tobacco manufacturing and leaf companies' efforts to influence Malawi government representatives and farming officials serve as an example of the ways in which the tobacco industry attempts to undermine global tobacco control policies. Through health policymakers' attention to tobacco industry influence in tobacco-growing societies, it might be possible to end industry interference and promote economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing, as envisioned in the FCTC. Despite the industry's success in mobilizing Malawi to oppose the FCTC, these efforts did not substantially weaken the framework or the implementing protocols that have been developed to date. j 
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